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Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist: Linking
Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice through the Lens
of Critique
Dustin N. Sharp*
Abstract
While historicaly seen as being in competition with the demands of peace, transitional
justice is increasingly accepted as an important element of post-conflict peacebuilding. Along
with the demobili.zation and disarmament of ex-combatants, securio sector reform, rule of law
programs, and elections, it has now joined a virtual checklist of initiatives to be carried out in
post-conflict countries. The growing sense of shared space between transitional justice and post-
conflict peacebuilding initiatives has sparked new interest in sounding out potential connections
between both fields. Although the pursuit of synergies is a worthwhile goal, I argue that in
developing these connections we must also be attentive to mutual shortcomings. Transiional
justice and post-conflict peacebuilding have historically proceeded on separate tracks, yet there
has been a remarkable similariy in the critiques and concerns that have been leveled against
both fields. More integrated approaches to peacebuilding and transitionaljustice may exacerbate
some of the tendencies that have given rise to these parallel critiques rather than alleviate them.
Seeking synergies through the optics of these historic concerns and critiques could be one
technique of resistance to these tendencies, leading to the development of innovative techniques for
building peace with jusice in conflict's wake.
Dustin Sharp, JD, Harvard Law School. Assistant Professor at the Kroc School of
Peace Studies at the University of San Diego. Sharp formerly practiced for the US
Department of State and Human Rights Watch. The author can be contacted at
dsharp@sandiego.edu.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, programs and interventions associated with
both international peacebuilding and transitional justice have increasingly
followed in war's wake.' Today, there is a growing demand for post-conflict
peacebuilding initiatives, partly for humanitarian reasons, and partly for strategic
reasons arising out of the conceptualization of failed and conflict states as a
global security issue.2 At the same time, the growth of transitional justice
practices may be creating a "justice cascade," a new global norm of
accountability that helps give rise to new trials and truth commissions year after
year.3 More and more, the question is not whether there will be some kind of
I I discuss evolving definitions of "international peacebuilding" in Section II. In general, however,
this article focuses on international peacebuilding initiatives and definitions central to the United
Nations (UN) system as opposed to the various types of interpersonal, community-level, and
"track-two" peacebuilding that are done by individuals, religious groups, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs).
2 See Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, Introduction, in Edward Newman,
Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, eds, New Perpectives on liberalPeacebuilding 3, 9 (UN 2009).
See generally Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World
Poktics (Norton 2011) (arguing that a global crescendo of human rights prosecutions demonstrates
the emergence of a new international norm of accountability); Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable
Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (Routledge 2d ed 2011) (discussing
the phenomenon of truth commissions and their spread throughout the world).
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justice in the aftermath of conflict, but what the timing, modalities, and
sequencing might be.4
In the post-conflict context, transitional justice and peacebuilding initiatives
often share the same temporal and geographic space, and several United Nations
(UN) peace operations have been given a mandate to address transitional justice
as well as more general peacebuilding activities.' Despite this, peacebuilding and
transitional justice have not always been seen as part of the same enterprise,6 and
linkages between them have not generally received a great deal of attention by
scholars Indeed, despite proximities of time and space, there has historically
been little coordination between traditional pillars of post-conflict peacebuilding,
such as the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-
combatants, security-sector reform (SSR), and transitional justice initiatives.8
There are signs that this historic, separate-tracks approach to peacebuilding
and transitional justice programs is changing. Although peace and justice have at
times been thought to be in tension with one another, rhetorically at least, they
are now seen as mutually supportive.9 There is a growing interest in both
academic and policy communities in exploring potential theoretical and
4 The various mechanisms associated with transitional justice are frequently applied in both post-
conflict and post-authoritarian scenarios. Because this article focuses on the overlaps between
transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding, however, I refer here to post-conflict
transitional justice.
5 Examples include the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional Authority in
East Timor (UNTAET).
6 Scholars and policymakers have long examined the possibility for tensions between peace and
justice initiatives, manifested in the so-called "peace versus justice" debate. See, for example,
Chandra Lekha Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice vs Peace in Times of Transition,
1-2 (Frank Cass 2004). In recent years, however, transitional justice advocates have tended to see
the various and sometimes contradictory goals of transitional justice as complementary. See
Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice, 30 Hum Rts Q 95, 98 (2008).
7 See Paul van Zyl, Promoting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies, in Alan Bryden and Heiner
Hdinggi, eds, Securiy Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 209, 210 (DCAF Yearly Books 2005).
8 See Lars Waldorf, Introduction: linking DDR and Transitional Justice, in Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo de
Greiff, and Lars Waldorf, eds, Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatants 14, 16
(International Center for Transitional Justice 2009) (discussing lack of coordination between
transitional justice and DDR); Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Roger Duthie, Enhandng Justice and
Development Through Justice-Sensitive Secu_y Sector Reform, in Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie, eds,
Transitional Justice and Development: Making Connections 214, 222 (International Center for
Transitional Justice 2009) (noting that the practices of SSR and transitional justice "rarely interact,
either in practice or in theory").
9 The mutual complementarity of peace, justice, and democracy has arguably been a UN doctrine at
least since the 2004 publication of a landmark report on transitional justice. See United Nations,
Report of the Secretary-General The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,
UN Doc S/2004/616 at 1 (2004) (asserting that "[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually
exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives").
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programmatic linkages between peacebuilding and transitional justice.1" Some in
those communities have called for better coordination in order to facilitate
complementarity." At a policy level, there are early indications that this is in fact
taking place. For example, in 2006 the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations set forth guidance encouraging greater linkages between DDR
programming and transitional justice. 12 Together with this new enthusiasm, some
have urged caution, pointing to the need to manage potentially significant
tensions between peacebuilding and transitional justice projects and programs."
Building peace with justice is a complex and long-term endeavor that calls
for holistic solutions that address crosscutting challenges. While peacebuilding is
ultimately a broader notion, both peacebuilding and transitional justice are open-
ended concepts with substantial overlap that "are contrived to achieve a
common purpose": long-term positive peace.14 Both seek to rebuild social trust
and social capital and attempt to address problems of governance,
accountability, and the need for institutional reform. To these same ends,
promoting synergies between peacebuilding and transitional justice programs
and initiatives is a worthwhile goal for policymakers, academics, and
practitioners alike. Indeed, the UN has recently overhauled its "peacebuilding
architecture" with the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) precisely
10 See, for example, Chandra Lekha Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Johanna Herman, Evaluating
and Comparing Strategies of Peacebuilding and TransitionalJustice 13 (JAD-PbP Working Paper Series No
1, May 2009) (discussing increasing linkages between transitional justice and a broader set of
peacebuilding activities); Alan Bryden, Timothy Donais, and Heiner Hinggi, Shaping a Securio-
Governance Agenda in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces Policy Paper No 11, Nov 2005) (examining policy linkages between SSR, DDR,
rule of law initiatives, and transitional justice); see also van Zyl, Promoting Transitional Justice at 210
(cited in note 7) (arguing that "[t]ransitional justice strategies should be understood as an
important component of peacebuilding").
11 See, for example, Johanna Herman, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Chandra Lekha Sriram, Beyond Justice
versus Peace: Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding Strategies, in Karin Aggestam and Annika Bj6rkdahl,
eds, Rethinking Peacebuilding: The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and the Western Balkans 48, 50
(Roudedge 2013) (observing the importance "to find commonalities between the transitional
justice and peacebuilding processes, particularly since activities in the field often overlap").
12 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Integrated Disarmament,
Demobili.Zation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), § 2.10 (DPKO 2006).
13 See generally Herman, Martin-Ortega, and Sriram, Beyond Justice versus Peace (cited in note 11)
(discussing the potential tensions between transitional justice, rule of law assistance, DDR, and
SSR).
14 Gerhard Thallinger, The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Transitional Justice, 8 German L J 681, 696
(2007). The term "negative peace" refers to the absence of direct violence. It stands in contrast
with the broader concept of "positive peace," which includes the absence of both direct and
indirect violence, including various forms of "structural violence" such as poverty, hunger, and
other forms of social injustice. See generally Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J
Peace Rsrch 167 (1969).
Vol. 14 No. 1
Beond the Post-Conflict Checklist
to avoid fragmented and duplicative efforts in the peacebuilding arena, broadly
conceived. 1
And yet, as this Article will argue, developing more integrated approaches to
peace and justice issues in the post-conflict context may create its own problems
and challenges. In particular, there is a danger that as transitional justice is
mainstreamed into emerging best practices for post-conflict reconstruction by
the PBC and other UN policy organs, together with DDR, SSR, rule of law
assistance, and elections, it will increasingly come to be seen as yet one more box
to tick on the "post-conflict checklist," a routine part of the template deployed
in the context of post-conflict peace operations. 6
In this regard, it is worth noting that traditional international peacebuilding
programs-including DDR, SSR, and rule of law assistance-as well as a
number of transitional justice initiatives have been subject to powerful, parallel
critiques: that they are too often externally driven, being planned and
implemented in a top-down and state-centric manner that gives insufficient
voice and agency to those most affected by the conflict; 7 that they are biased
toward Western approaches, giving too little attention to local or indigenous
peace and justice traditions; 8 that they are presented as technocratic, neutral, and
15 See Dustin Sharp, Bridging the Gap; the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and the Challenges of
Integrating DDR and TransitionalJustice, in Chandra Lekha Sriram, et al, eds, TransifionalJuslice and
Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims andEx-Combatants 23, 24-25 (Routledge 2012).
16 The problem of template-based or one-size- fits- all peacebuilding initiatives is a frequent trope in
both academic and policy literature. See, for example, Roger Mac Ginty, Indigenous Peace-Making
versus the liberal Peace, 43 Cooperation and Conflict: J of the Nordic Intl Studies Assn 139, 144
(2008) (observing the existence of "set templates" and a "formulaic path" in internationally
sponsored peacebuilding); Edward Newman, 'Liberal"Peacebuilding Debates, in Newman, Paris, and
Richmond, eds, New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding2 6, 42 (cited in note 2) (noting that "[a] core
problem of contemporary peacebuilding is its tendency to be formulaic"); International Crisis
Group, Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, Crisis Group Africa Report No 87 at 9
(2004) (criticizinga mechanistic "operational checklist" approach to post-conflict peacebuilding in
which the international community assumes it can safely withdraw after rote implementation of a
series of initiatives: deployment of peacekeeping troops, disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of ex-combatants, the repatriation and return of refugees and internally displaced
persons, security sector and judicial reform, transitional justice initiatives, and, finally, a first
election).
17 See, for example, Oliver Richmond, The Romanticisation of the Local We/fare, Culture, andPeacebuildi,g
44 Intl Spectator: ItalJ Intl Aff 149, 161-63 (discussingthe tendency toward top-down institution
building in a variety of "liberal" interventions); Kora Andrieu, Civili!jng Peacebuilding: Transitional
Justice, Civil Socie(y and the Liberal Paradigm, 41 Security Dialogue 537, 541 (2010) (noting that
"transitional justice seems to be strongly under the influence of [al top-down state-building
approach.")
18 See, for example, Mac Ginty, 43 Cooperation and Conflict: J of the Nordic Intl Stud Assn at 144-
45 (cited in note 16) (noting that Western approaches to peacebuilding "risk H minimizing the
space for organic local, traditional or indigenous contributions to peace-making'); Wendy
Lambourne, Transitiona/Justice and PeacebuildingAfterMass Violence, 3 IntlJ Transitional just 28, 32-
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apolitical solutions to highly contested or contestable political issues and
choices;" and that they ultimately reflect not local needs and realities, but a
dominant "liberal international peacebuilding" paradigm that seeks to foster
Western, market-oriented democracies in the wake of conflict without
considering the tensions this may unleash in the immediate aftermath of
conflict.20 Considered together, there is reason to worry that better integration
and coordination between peacebuilding and transitional justice might
exacerbate some of the tendencies that have given rise to these parallel critiques
rather than alleviate them.
As academics and policymakers begin to sound out linkages and synergies,
viewing transitional justice and peacebuilding overlaps through the prism of
these critiques might help us to strengthen policies that seek to promote
complementarity. At the same time, addressing some of these critiques may cast
doubt upon the prospects of more coordinated approaches to post-conflict
peacebuilding altogether. The types of locally owned, context-specific, and
bottom-up solutions frequently advocated in the literature may take us beyond
the "post-conflict checklist," but they also call into question the role of
international organizations and international standards that are typically part and
parcel of international post-conflict assistance. Yet from a pragmatic and realist
standpoint, a balance between local and international agency in post-conflict
programming seems both inevitable and desirable, and both "locals" and
"internationals" have a stake in finding creative solutions to peacebuilding and
transitional justice challenges, and learning from and applying the lessons of best
practices elsewhere.21
Ultimately, striking a better balance might involve more hybridized forms of
peacebuilding and transitional justice that involve a mixture of conventional and
local practices and models.' While this Article will not attempt to set forth a
34 (2009) (calling for a revalorization of local and cultural approaches to justice and
reconciliation).
19 See, for example, Newman, "Liberal" Peacebuilding Debates at 42 (cited in note 16) (critiquing
attempts to .'de-politicize' peacebuilding and present it as a technical task"); Patricia Lundy and
Mark McGovern, Whose Justice?Rethinking Transitionaljusticefrom the Bottom Up, 35 J L & Socy 265,
276-77 (2008) (arguing that "wider geo-political and economic interests too often shape what
tend to be represented as politically and economically neutral post-conflict and transitional justice
initiatives").
20 See generally Roland Paris,AI War's End: Building Peace after Nationalist Conflict (Cambridge 2004);
Chandra Sriram, Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of TransitionalJustice, 21 Global
Socy 579 (2007).
21 See Laura Arriaza and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, SocialReconstruction as Local Process,2 IntlJ Transitional
just 152, 153 (2008) (arguing for strategies that "incorporate a perspective that encompasses
bottom-up local efforts as well as top-down state-driven or internationally driven ones").
22 See Newman, Paris, and Richmond, Introduction at 16 (cited in note 2).
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comprehensive and integrated approach along these lines, it will argue that
attentiveness to some of the parallel critiques leveled against both peacebuilding
and transitional justice interventions could lead to shifts that would strengthen
policy in both areas in the process of promoting linkages. The possibility of
integrating local reconciliation practices into both transitional justice
mechanisms and reintegration schemes for former combatants is one such
possibility that will be briefly examined in this Article.
This Article will proceed in five sections. In Section II, I discuss the origins
and evolution of both peacebuilding and transitional justice since the end of the
Cold War. In Section 1II, I evaluate some of the broad and parallel critiques that
have been leveled against peacebuilding and transitional justice. In Section IV, I
examine the possibility for greater coordination between peacebuilding and
transitional justice, looking to potential tensions and complementarity at a
programmatic level, particularly through the lens of the longstanding critiques
discussed in Section III. I argue that greater attention to these critiques might
help to inspire modes of coordination and complementarity that will avoid some
of the dangers of a standardized, checklist approach to post-conflict
peacebuilding. Section V concludes the Article.
II. ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF PEACEBUILDING AND
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
The growth and expansion of international peacebuilding efforts associated
with the end of the Cold War has been paralleled by an explosion of interest in
the various mechanisms associated with transitional justice. In post-conflict
countries today, there is an increased likelihood that at least some of the various
programs and initiatives associated with both international peacebuilding and
transitional justice will be marshaled as part of a response to violent conflict.
The following section briefly outlines the origins of both fields with a view to
understanding the critiques that will be discussed in Section III of this Article.
A. The Growth and Expansion of Peace Operations
With the end of the Cold War, the world experienced a rapid expansion
in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and UN peace operations
quickly grew in both sophistication and complexity. The thick, multi-
dimensional mandates associated with UN missions today stand in contrast to
the relatively thin approaches previously taken. During the Cold War,
peacekeeping actions placed a premium on neutrality, consent, and minimum
Summer 2013
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force-notions all central to traditional conceptions of sovereignty.23 So-called
"first generation"24 or consensual peacekeeping often involved interposition of
forces for the monitoring of ceasefires geared toward containing conflicts and
maintaining stability.25 Such practices were largely based on the felt importance
of maintaining international security between states as opposed to the intra-state
conflict and civil wars that we often associate with conflict today.26 Rather than
attempting to address "root causes" or to resolve conflict, the driving idea was
to contain international instability in an era when a larger confrontation between
great powers was to be avoided at all costs.
If these early peacekeeping efforts were relatively minimalist and
involved the avoidance of domestic politics, the end of the Cold War brought
about a huge shift in the approach to conflict management, and the UN
increasingly found itself called upon in these next generation initiatives to
address underlying economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems
premised on the idea that managing the often internal conflicts of the post-Cold
War world required a multi-faceted approach. Thus, from managing conflict
between states, there was a shift to the perceived need to build peace within states,
from traditional acts of peacekeeping authorized under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter,2 to more complex, and, from a traditional Westphalian perspective,
more intrusive acts ofpeacebuilding that were frequently authorized under Chapter
VII.28 This shift was bolstered by the belief that threats to security come not just
from interstate wars, but also from weak, failing, and conflict-prone states, and,
particularly in the post-9/1 1 world, non-state actors.29
23 See Simon Chesterman, You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-
Building 238 (Oxford 2004).
24 Some refer to three different generations of peacekeeping, which evolved in quick succession in
the early 1990s. See, for example, id. Others, such as Roland Paris, simply distinguish between
"traditional" peacekeeping and "peacebuilding operations." See Roland Paris, Peacekeeping and the
Constraints of Global Culture, 9 Eur J Ind Rel 441,448-50 (2003).
25 Examples of this approach to peacekeeping include the UN Military Observer Group in India and
Pakistan (established in 1949) designed to monitor a ceasefire, the UN Peacekeeping Force in
Cyprus (established in 1964) established to prevent fighting between Turk and Cypriot
communities, and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (established in 1974) after the
disengagement of Israel and Syria from the Golan Heights.
26 See Newman, Paris, and Richmond, Introduction at 6 (cited in note 2).
27 United Nations Charter Art 11, 1.
28 Examples of more complex, multi-dimensional peace operations include Cambodia, Angola,
Burundi, Central African Republic, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Chad, Sudan,
C6te d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Kosovo, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Timor-Leste, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, and Croatia.
29 See Newman, Paris, and Richmond, Introduction at 9 (cited in note 2).
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The concept of "post-conflict peacebuilding" that has come to be
associated with multi-dimensional UN peace operations is often attributed to
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his 1992 Agenda for Peace
report, which defined it as "action to identify and support structures which will
tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict."3
Since that time, the concept has been institutionalized across a number of
organizations outside of the UN system that use it to frame and organize a
variety of post-conflict activities. 31 The term has come to comprise efforts to
disarm previously warring parties, reintegrate former soldiers into society,
demine and destroy weapons, rebuild the security and judicial sectors, repatriate
or resettle refugees, and engage in various forms of democracy and governance
assistance, including monitoring elections.32
Twenty years after the UN offered its initial definition, the term
peacebuilding has, if anything, come to be construed in even more expansive
terms. According to a recent UN working definition, peacebuilding "involves a
range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict
by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to
lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development., 33 This definition is
spectacularly broad and, together with the shift from first to successive
generations of peacekeeping, could be seen as demonstrating a growing
commitment on the part of the UN system to the idea of building "positive
peace," rather than simply maintaining "negative peace., 34
The increasingly broad mandates and obligations of UN peacekeeping
missions across the world to include various aspects of peacebuilding and
statebuilding 35 were not initially met with a significant evolution of the UN's
institutional doctrine or structure, leading to redundant and ad hoc efforts and a
30 United Nations, Agenda for Peace, Preventative Doilomay, Peacemaking and Peace Keeping, UN Doc
A/47/277-S/24111 at 6, 21 (1992).
31 See Michael Barnett, et al, Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?, 13 Global Governance 35, 45-48
(2007).
32 See United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Prnples and Guidelines 26 (United
Nations 2008), online at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Iibrary/Capstone-DoctrineENG.pdf
(visited Apr 8, 2013).
33 Id at 18.
34 See generally Sharp, Bridging the Gap (cited in note 15).
35 For a discussion of the evolution of peacebuilding and statebuilding discourse, see generally John
Heathershaw, Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Divi&ng and Meging of Peacebuilding Discourses, 36
Millennium: J Int Studies 597 (2008). In general, while peacebuilding is the more inclusive term,
statebuilding tends to focus more narrowly on rebuilding the core institutions and apparatuses of
a modern, liberal state in the aftermath of conflict.
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general lack of coordination.36 However, the seemingly inevitable involvement in
increasingly complex post-conflict initiatives eventually culminated in the 2005
creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which has been tasked
with facilitating integrated approaches to post-conflict reconstruction
throughout the UN system and beyond.37 Today, the coordination, direction,
and implementation of the vast majorit7 of on-the-ground peacekeeping
missions across the world is done by the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO), and many such missions today have significant
peacebuilding components.3
B. Transitional Justice: From the Exception to the
Mainstream
While definitions of transitional justice vary and have evolved over time,
most of them attempt to capture a legal, political, and moral dilemma about how
to deal with historic human rights violations and political violence in societies
undergoing some form of political transition.39 The institutional mechanisms
most closely associated with the field are trials and truth commissions, though
reparations, lustration, and broader institutional reform are also central. 40 Taken
36 Liliana Lyra Jubilut, Towards a New Jus Post Bellum: The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and the
Improvement of Post-Conflict Efforts andAccountabiliy, 9 Minn J Intl L 26, 31 (2011).
37 See General Assembly Res No 60/180, UN Doc A/RES/60/180 at 2, 11-2 (2005); Security
Council Res No 1645, UN Doc S/RES/1645 at 2, 1-2 (2005). The UN's new peacebuilding
architecture also includes a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), which acts as a secretariat to
the PBC, and serves the UN secretary-general in coordinating UN agencies in their peacebuilding
efforts, as well as a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), administered by the PBSO, intended to address
immediate peacebuilding needs in countries emerging from conflict, and thereby fill a critical gap
in post-conflict project financing.
38 Of course, beyond DPKO, full implementation of peace operations around the world is also the
work of many UN agencies, ranging from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR).
39 For a review of how definitions of transitional justice have evolved over time, see Rosemary
Nagy, Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections, 29 Third World Q 275, 277-78 (2008).
40 According to a landmark 2004 UN report, transitional justice comprises
the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to
ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may
include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of
international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions,
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a
combination thereof.
United Nations, The Rule of Law and TransitionalJustice in Post-Conflict Societies at 4, 8 (cited in note
9).
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together, transitional justice is often said to be both backward looking, insofar as
it is closely associated with justice and accountability for previous human rights
violations, and forward looking, insofar as its advocates often claim that justice
is essential to prevent recurrence and to lay the groundwork for longer term
peace and stability.4'
As with peacebuilding, the birth and rapid growth of transitional justice
is closely associated with political currents near the end of the Cold War.
Specifically, as a field of policy, practice, and study, transitional justice has its
origins in the so-called "third wave" of democratic transitions that swept
Eastern Europe and Latin America in the late 1980s and 1990s. 42 Indeed, the
origins of transitional justice in the deliberations of how new democracies ought
to respond to massive human rights violations is key to understanding the
parameters and practices of the field. 43 Early thinking about justice in transition
often focused on the need to deliver enough justice to contribute to building a
new democratic order, without at the same time endangering the democratic
transition itself." Like its parent field of human rights, transitional justice was
preoccupied with accountability for abuses. It also sought to achieve justice in
41 See, for example, Andrieu, 41 Sec Dialogue at 538 (cited in note 17) (noting that transitional
justice has both forward- and backward-looking aspects); Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, Enhancing
Justice and Development at 224 (cited in note 8) (arguing that it would be a mistake to see transitional
justice as solely backward looking); Andrew Valls, RacialJustice as TransitionalJustice, 36 Polity 53,
58 (2003) (arguing for a balanced approach to transitional justice that takes into account both
forward- and backward-looking dimensions).
42 See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The 'I hird Wave: DemocratiZation in the Late Twentieth Centugy, in
Neil J. Kritz, ed, 1 Transitional Justice. How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes 65
(United States Institute of Peace 1995). While the term "transitional justice" was coined some
twenty years ago, it has been argued that transitional justice did not coalesce as a distinct "field"
until sometime after 2000. See Paige Arthur, How 'Transitions" Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual
Histogy of Transitional Justice, 31 Hum Rts Q 321, 329-32 (2009) (tracing the history of the use of
the term "transitional justice"); Christine Bell, Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the
'Field" or 'Non-Field," 3 Ind J Transitional Just 5, 7 (2009) (arguing that transitional justice did not
emerge as a distinct field until after 2000). Of course, the practices associated with transitional
justice go back for centuries if not millennia. See generally Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional
Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge 2004) (reviewing historic practices now associated with
the modern field of transitional justice).
43 See Thomas Hansen, The Vertical and Horizontal Expansions of Transitional Justice: Explanations and
Implications for a Contested Field, in Susanne Zistel, et al, eds, Transitional Justice Theories 1, 2
(Routledge forthcoming 2013) (prepublication version on file with author).
44 Political scientists of the period focusing on the dilemmas of transitional justice analyzed the role
of bargains between elite groups in striking a balance been the demands of justice and the needs
of the democratic transition. See generally Huntington, The Third Wave (cited in note 42);
Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, in Kritz, ed, 1 TransitionalJustice 57 (cited in note 42).
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ways that would facilitate a transition not just to democracy but to something
resembling Western liberal democracy.4"
In the quarter century that has followed the emergence of transitional
justice discourse and practice, it has evolved from a discourse of exception and
deviation-something thought to be different from ordinary forms of justice to
be deployed on an ad hoc basis during a period of rupture-to something that
has in many ways been institutionalized, regularized, and mainstreamed.46
Increasingly, the question is not whether some kind of justice will be delivered
during periods of transition but what the sequencing and modalities might be.47
The upward trajectory and expansion of the field are in part reflected in
its embrace by a landmark 2004 report by the UN secretary-general.48 Indeed,
over the last twenty years, the UN system as a whole has become heavily
involved in a number of transitional justice processes around the world. The
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda
(ICTR) were both created by the Security Council. In Sierra Leone, East Timor,
Cambodia, Bosnia, and Lebanon, the UN created hybrid international tribunals.
Today, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has the lead
responsibility for transitional justice issues, having supported transitional justice
45 See Arthur, 31 Hum Rts Q at 325-26 (cited in note 42) (arguing that transition to democracy was
the "dominant normative lens" through which political change was viewed in the early years of
transitional justice practice and scholarship); see also Lundy and McGovern, 35 J L & Socy at 273
(cited in note 19) (arguing that '[tlransition,' as normally conceived within transitional justice
theory, tends to involve a particular and limited conception of democratization and democracy
based on liberal and essentially Western formulations of democracy"). For an argument that
mainstream human rights practice of the period also sought to replicate essentially Western liberal
models of governance, see generally Makau wa Mutua, The Ideolog of Human Rights, 36 Va J Ind L
589 (1996).
46 See, for example, Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice in a New Era, 26 Fordham Intl L J 893, 894
(2002) (noting the emergence of a "steady state" phase of transitional justice in which "the post-
conflict dimension of transitional justice is moving from the exception to the norm"); see also
Nagy, 29 Third World Q at 276 (cited in note 39) (noting the standardization of transitional
justice); Kieran McEvoy, Bqyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of TransitionalJustice, 34 J L
& Socy 411, 412 (2007) (observing that "[t]ransitional justice has emerged from its historically
exceptionalist origins to become something which is normal, institutionalized and
mainstreamed"). For an argument that transitional justice is not exceptional, and that the so-called
dilemmas of transitional justice are in fact little more than the dilemmas of "ordinary" justice, see
generally Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinay Justice, 117 Harv L
Rev 762 (2003).
47 See Nagy, 29 Third World Q at 276 (cited in note 39)
48 See generally United Nations, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies (cited in
note 9).
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programs in some twenty countries around the world.49 The Bureau of Crisis
Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) at the UN Development Programme also
works to support transitional justice efforts. Although it does not have an
explicit mandate to work on transitional justice issues and its record of practice
is only beginning to be established, the newly created PBC has already identified
support for transitional justice initiatives as key to peacebuilding.5 °
As transitional justice practices have become increasingly normalized and
embraced by key global institutions like the UN, the field has begun to move
beyond its roots and association with the political transitions of the late 1980s
and 1990s to Western liberal democracy, and it has become associated with post-
conflict peacebuilding situations more generally, even including those that do
not involve a liberal transition.5 With this expansion have come calls to broaden
the parameters of transitional justice work. Thus, arguments have been made
that there should be greater linkages between transitional justice and
development work,52 anti-corruption efforts,53 security sector reform, 4 the DDR
of former combatants,55 and other peacebuilding activities.56 At the level of
49 See United Nations, Message by Ms. Navanethem Pillay at the Special Summit of the Afican Union (Oct
22, 2009) online at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/O/1lOE705FlO34E048C1257
657005814CE?opendocument (visited Apr 9, 2013).
50 For example, in Burundi, one of the first two countries added to the PBC's agenda, the
commission identified lack of accountability for human rights abuses as a cause of the conflict
and continued impunity as a factor contributing to potential relapse into conflict. With this in
mind, support for transitional justice initiatives forms one of the pillars in Burundi's strategic
framework for peacebuilding. See United Nations, Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi,
UN Doc PBC/1/BDI/4 at 7, 16, 9-10, 30-31 (2007).
51 One prominent example is Rwanda, which, despite its association with several forms of
transitional justice (ranging from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, to domestic
prosecutions, to a nationwide accountability process known as gacaca loosely based on Rwandan
tradition), could hardly be considered democratic. See generally Phil Clark and Zachary D.
Kaufman, eds, After Genocide: TransitionalJusice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recondation in Rwanda
and Beyond (Columbia 2009).
52 See generally de Greiff and Duthie, eds, Transitional Justice and Development (cited in note 8); Roger
Duthie, Toward a Development-Sensilive Approach to Transitional Justice, 2 Intl J Transitional Just 292
(2008); Rama Mani, Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Foging the Nexus Between Transitional
Justice and Development: Editorial, 2 Intl J Transitional Just 253 (2008).
53 See generally Ruben Carranza, Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and
Economic Crimes?, 2 Intl J Transitional Just 310 (2008).
54 See generally Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, Enhancing Justice and Development (cited in note 8); Corey
Barr, Making Connections: Bridging TransitionalJustice and Security Sector Reform to Confront Conflict-Related
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, 26 PRAXIS: Fletcher J Hum Security 5 (2011); Eirin Mobekk,
Transitional Justice and Securio Sector Reform: Enabling Sustainable Peace (Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces Occasional Paper No 13, Nov 2006).
55 See generally Sharp, Bridging the Gap (cited in note 15); Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf, eds,
Disarming the Past (cited in note 8).
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institutional mechanisms and practice, transitional justice has expanded well
beyond trials and truth commissions, and there is an increasing interest in the
embrace of more traditional and indigenous forms of justice and reconciliation
work.17 Yet despite this expansion across multiple dimensions, in many ways
transitional justice institutions and mechanisms retain some of the hallmarks and
limitations of the field's origins in the democratic transitions of the late 1980s
and 1990s, as discussed in Section III.
I1. PARALLEL CRITIQUES OF PEACEBUILDING AND
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
As post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice have expanded and to
some degree become both normalized and institutionalized in the post-Cold War
era, they have also been subject to trenchant critiques from academics, activists,
and policymakers. While the programs associated with international
peacebuilding assistance, such as DDR and SSR, have historically had little
connection to transitional justice initiatives, either in terms of theory or policy
and practice, many of the critiques leveled against international efforts in both
domains strongly echo each other. Particularly given calls for greater linkages
between peacebuilding and transitional justice, these parallel critiques bear close
examination.
I have grouped the critiques into three loose general categories below: (a) the
critique of liberal international peacebuilding; (b) the critique of politics as
neutral technology; and (c) the debate about local versus international. These
groupings are not meant to be definitive, and the critiques explored below are in
no way exhaustive. For some scholars, such as Roland Paris, these critiques
should all be disentangled from each other and do not necessarily go hand in
hand.58 For others, many of the concerns raised below cannot be disassociated
from what has become known as the critique of liberal international
peacebuilding 9 What can be fairly said is that the critiques discussed below
56 See Sriram, Martin-Ortega, and Herman, Evaluating and Coparing Strategies of Peacebuilding and
Transitional Justice at 13 (cited in note 10) (discussing general linkages between transitional justice
and a broad set of peacebuilding activities).
57 Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Rwanda are but three examples of the incorporation of local
tradition into larger transitional justice processes. See generally Patrick Burgess, A New Approach to
Restorative Justice: East Timor's Communio Reconciliation Process, in Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier
Mariezcurrena, eds, TransitionalJusice in the Tweno-First Century (Cambridge 2006); Christopher J.
Le Mon, Rwanda's Troubled Gacaca Courts, 14 Hum Rts Brief 16 (2007); Augustine S.J. Park,
Communi-Based Restorative Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone, 13 Contemp Just Rev 95 (2010).
58 See Roland Paris, Saving Liberal Peacebuilding 36 Rev Intl Studies 337, 363 (2010).
59 See generally Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner, and Michael Pugh, The End of Histog and the Last Liberal
Peacebuilder A Rep# to Roland Paris, 37 Rev Intl Studies 1995 (2011).
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often share substantial overlap but that the groupings nevertheless serve a useful
role for purposes of discussion and analysis.
A. The Critique of Liberal International Peacebuilding
For the last two decades, international post-conflict peacebuilding efforts
have most often taken place in developing rather than developed countries. o For
explanation, one could point to evidence suggesting that poor countries are
more prone to civil wars, but a fuller understanding would also need to account
for the entrenched global power dynamics and Security Council vetoes that
make interventions predicated on building peace and justice more likely in the
smaller, poorer countries of the world.61 Given these trends, it appears that both
peacebuilding and transitional justice interventions will have a greater footprint
in the developing world than the developed world for the foreseeable future.62
With these broad trends as a backdrop, the critique of liberal
international peacebuilding posits that in practice, peacebuilding interventions
have largely been premised on a model of liberal internationalism that conceives
of market-oriented economies and Western-style liberal democracy as the unique
pathway to peace.63 The interventions contrived to bring about just such a liberal
peace are seen to constitute a sort of modem-day mission civilisatrice.4 Yet because
many of the post-conflict and developing countries in which peacebuilding
interventions take place have a historical and cultural grounding that varies from
that of the Occident, some argue that the emphasis on elections, democracy, and
free markets associated with the typical package of post-conflict peacebuilding
60 Examples are not in short supply, and include multi -dimensional UN peace operations in
Cambodia, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, Chad, Sudan, C6te d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Kosovo, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Timor-Leste.
61 See Paul Collier, et al, Breakingthe Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy 22 (World Bank and
Oxford 2003) (arguing that civil wars are more likely in low-income countries).
62 For an argument that at least some of the patterns that have led to international interventions in
the past are changing, see generally Scott Straus, Wars Do End! Changing Patterns of Political Violence
in Sub-SaharanAfrica, 443 Afr Aff 179 (2012). Straus argues that wars, major forms of large-scale
organized political violence, and episodes of large-scale mass killing of civilians are declining in
frequency and intensity in Sub-Saharan Africa. See generally id. It is worth noting, however, that,
according to Straus, other forms of political violence, such as electoral violence and violence over
access to livelihood resources, are increasing or persistent. Even the low-level insurgencies that
Straus lists as exemplary of future trends, such as Darfur and the Lord's Resistance Army in
Uganda, have resulted in various forms of international intervention.
63 See Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of LiberalInternationalism, 22 Intl Sec 54, 56 (1997).
64 See generally Roland Paris, International Peacebuilding and the "Mission Civilisatrice", 28 Rev Intl
Studies 637 (2002).
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interventions can be both dangerous and destabilizing.6" The critique suggests
they are potentially dangerous and destabilizing because rapid economic and
political liberalization can give rise to grievances and political competition with
which the often fragile or shattered institutions in post-conflict countries are as
yet too weak to cope.66
The combined effects of peace operations and development assistance
facilitated by liberalizing international financial institutions such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund may therefore be to create instability
and even a return to conflict. 6 For this reason, some critics of liberal
international peacebuilding have advocated "institutionalization before
liberalization," a focus on strengthening the institutions of economic and
political governance prior to full liberalization.68 Of course, the disastrous rush
to elections as a departure strategy that has been associated with some early UN
peace operations has in fact been moderated in recent years with an increased
emphasis on institution building, including broad categories of programming
such as rule of law assistance, DDR, and SSR.69 Nevertheless, some critics argue
that even in its current form, international peacebuilding may involve the
imposition of Western institutional preferences that, at their core, are still largely
premised on "neoliberal policies of open markets . . . and governance policies
focused on enhancing instruments of state coercion."' Equally worrisome, the
strongest critics argue, is that there is little space to dissent from the prevailing
and hegemonic international peacebuilding paradigm. 1
Applying the critique of liberal international peacebuilding to transitional
justice, Chandra Sriram argues that mainstream justice strategies "share key
assumptions about preferable arrangements, and a faith that other key goods-
65 See generally, Paris, At War's End (cited in note 20).
66 See generally id.
67 Without attempting to discern the cause, it is worth recalling in this regard that a significant
portion of civil wars reignite within a period of five years of their supposed settlement. See Paul
Collier and Anke Hoeffler, On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, 46 J Conflict Resol 13, 17 (2002);
Astri Suhrke and Ingrid Samset, What's in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War, 14 Intl
Peacekeeping 195, 197-98 (2007).
68 See Paris, 22 Intl Sec at 57-58 (cited in note 63).
69 For a critique of the rush to rapid elections, see Chesterman, You, The People, at 204-35 (cited in
note 23).
70 See Cooper, Turner, and Pugh, 37 Rev Intl Studies at 1995 (cited in note 59); Chandra Lekha
Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Johanna Herman, Promoting the Rule of Law: From Liberal to
Institutional Peacebuilding, in Chandra Lekha Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Johanna Herman, eds,
Peacebuilding and the Rule of Law in Africa: Just Peace? 1, 1-2 (Taylor & Francis 2010) (arguing that
promoting institutionalization as a response to the critique of liberal international peacebuilding
may also entail an imposition).
71 See Cooper, Turner, and Pugh, 37 Rev Intl Studies at 1995 (cited in note 59)
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democracy, free markets, 'justice'-can essentially stand in for, and necessarily
create peace." 72 To the contrary, Sriram argues that transitional justice processes
and mechanisms may, like liberal peacebuilding, destabilize post-conflict and
post-atrocity countries because "calls for justice are likely to generate tensions
and exacerbate conflicts that have the potential to undermine peacebuilding. 7 3
And as with the other components of liberal peacebuilding, transitional justice
strategies are often rooted in Western modalities of justice imposed from the
outside.74
While transitional justice processes have historically been linked to an
emphasis on building Western-style democracies, these processes have not
traditionally been associated with the push for free markets.71 Sriram therefore
notes that transitional justice might not be as subject to this aspect of the
critique of liberal international peacebuilding. 76 However, it is worth noting that
while trials and truth commissions around the world have tended to focus on
accountability for violations of physical integrity (murder, rape, torture,
disappearances) and civil and political rights more generally, issues of economic
and distributive justice and economic and social rights, have often been placed in
the background of transitional justice practice and concern.77 The effect has at
times generated outrage over acts of physical violence conceived of as
exceptional evils, while leaving the larger economic and social status quo intact,
perhaps thereby obfuscating and legitimating patterns of economic violence that
may be equally devastating." In this sense, transitional justice has paralleled the
neoliberal market orientation that is featured in the critique of liberal
international peacebuilding. Thus, it would seem that the paradigmatic "third
wave" transitions at the origins of transitional justice, transitions from
authoritarianism and communism to market-oriented, Western-style democracy,
were crucial not only to structuring the initial conceptual boundaries of the field
but also remain relevant to understanding the field's existing practices today.79
72 Sriram, 21 Global Socy at 579 (cited in note 20).
73 Id at 583.
74 See id at 591.
75 See id at 580.
76 See Sriram, 21 Global Socy at 580 (cited in note 20).
77 See Zinaida Miller, Effects of Intisibiliy: In Search of the 'Economic" in Transitional Justice, 2 Intl J
Transitional Just 266, 275-76 (2008).
78 Dustin N. Sharp, Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition: Toward a Positive-Peace Paradgm
for Transilionaljustice, 35 Fordham Ind L J 780, 781-82 (2012).
79 Arthur, 31 Hum Rts Q at 326 (cited in note 42).
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B. Politics as Neutral Technology
A second criticism of both international peacebuilding and transitional
justice that is related to but distinguishable from the critique of liberal
international peacebuilding is the argument that that they are both presented as
technocratic, neutral, and apolitical solutions to highly contested or contestable
political issues and choices. In other words, the choice as to the modalities of
better forms of governance and questions that arise out of a desire for justice
(for example, justice for whom, for what, and to what ends?) are highly political
choices that have important consequences for the distribution of political,
economic, social, and cultural power in the post-conflict context.80 Yet, a
perennial feature of the various components of post-conflict peacebuilding, such
as rule of law and democracy assistance, is that they are often imagined as
fundamentally apolitical and neutral technologies-a misperception that
obfuscates the difficult tradeoffs that need to be made to further important
post-conflict objectives such as development, security, and human rights
protection." Thus, critics of both peacebuilding and transitional justice have
argued that the fundamentally political nature of both enterprises needs to be
brought to the surface.82
The need to more openly assess the tensions, tradeoffs, and debates that
undergird peacebuilding and transitional justice interventions is all the more
plain if we take seriously the notion that they serve to replicate essentially
Western liberal economic and governance models. In this regard, it is important
to examine the discourse of the local that has emerged in recent years in the
critique of both peacebuilding and transitional justice.
80 See Nagy, 29 Third World Q at 280-86 (cited in note 39) (employing the categories of when,
whom, and what in order to interrogate the limits of mainstreamed transitional justice).
81 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-Coiflict Rebuilding: A CriticalExaminaihn,
49 Wm & Mary L Rev 1347, 1349 (2008) (arguing that renewed enthusiasm for building the rule
of law in the post-conflict context represents a "desire to escape from politics by imagining the
rule of law as technical, legal, and apolitical"); Ole Sending, Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownerslip
and Be Sensitive to Context 8 (Security in Practice, NUPI Working Paper 755, 2009) (observing that
the ends of liberal international peacebuilding are often imagined to be "a-historical and pre-
political').
82 See, for example, Newman, 'liberal" Peacebuilding Debates at 42-43 (cited in note 16), (critiquing
attempts to 'de-politicize' peacebuilding and present it as a technical task'); Lundy and
McGovern, 35 J L & Socy at 277 (cited in note 19) (arguing that the "rise in interventionism,
based on Western conceptions of justice, has also been paralleled by reluctance on the part of
many rule of law experts to acknowledge the political dimensions of such activities" and that
"[expressing transitional justice questions as a series of technical issues offsets this potentially
troubling recognition'); Leebaw, 30 Hum Rts Q at 98-106 (cited in note 6) (arguing that the
seeming consensus as to the goals of transitional justice masks a deeper politicization and debate,
but that it has become difficult to assess the tensions, trade-offs, and dilemmas associated with
transitional justice to the extent that they have been re-conceptualized in apolitical terms).
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C. The "Local" versus the "International"
A third set of concerns leveled against both international peacebuilding
and transitional justice broadly addresses the extent to which an appropriate
balance has been struck between the "local" and the "international" in terms of
agency, input, and authority over post-conflict planning and programming.
Concerns about striking the right balance take a number of rhetorical forms, and
include the worry that post-conflict agendas are "externally driven," that they are
planned and implemented in a "top-down" manner, or otherwise fail to give
sufficient agency to local actors with respect to core issues and choices.83 A
related concern is the extent to which mainstream peacebuilding and transitional
justice initiatives are biased toward Western approaches, giving too little
attention to local practices of promoting peace, justice, and reconciliation. 84 In
recent years, exploration of the complexity of the discourse of the local has
experienced renewed interest in academic circles.8" At rhetorical level at least, the
importance of local or national ownership has now become a virtual UN mantra
in official policy documents.86 Yet despite all of the attention, the precise
meaning of the discourse of local ownership in peacebuilding remains imprecise
and poorly understood.87
Broadly speaking, the mobilization of the concept of the local in the
context of peacebuilding debates might be viewed as an argument over strategy
83 See, for example, Richmond, 44 Ind Spectator: Ital J Intl Aff at 161-63 (cited in note 17)
(discussing the tendency toward top-down institution building in a variety of "liberal"
interventions); Andrieu, 41 Sec Dialogue at 541 (cited in note 17) (noting that "transitional justice
seems to be strongly under the influence of [a] top-down state-building approach"); Sriram, 21
Global Socy at 591 (cited in note 20) (noting that "[t]ransitional justice, and in particular trials, are
frequently imported from the outside and occasionally externally imposed").
84 See, for example, Mac Ginty, 43 Cooperation and Conflict: J of the Nordic Intl Studies Assn at
144-45 (cited in note 16) (noting that Western approaches to peacebuilding "risk minimizing the
space for organic local, traditional or indigenous contributions to peace-making"); Lamboume, 3
Intl J Transitional Just at 30 (cited in note 18) (calling for a revalorization of local and cultural
approaches to justice and reconciliation).
85 See generally, for example, Timothy Donais, Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership
in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes, 34 Peace & Change 3 (2009); Richmond, 44 Intl Spectator: Ital
J Intl Aff 149 (cited in note 17); Simon Chesterman, Ownership in Theoy and in Practice: Tranifer of
Authoriby in UN Statebuilding Operations, 1 J of Intervention and Statebuilding 3 (2007).
86 See, for example, United Nations, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Soceties at 7, 17 (cited in note 9) (arguing that the UN must "learn better how to respect and
support local ownership, local leadership and a local constituency for reform"); United Nations,
Report of the Secretag General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, UN Doc
A/63/881-S/2009/304 at 4, 7 (2009) (observing that "[tihe imperative of national ownership is
a central theme of the present report').
87 See Chesterman, 1 J of Intervention and Statebuilding at 7-10 (cited in note 85) (reviewing the
evolution of the concept of local ownership).
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in which context-specific solutions are pitted against a perceived standardization
or a checklist approach to post-conflict programming.88 Yet the discourse of the
local could also be thought of as one of resistance to the perceived hegemony of
liberal international peacebuilding itself insofar as it is conceived of or forms
part of a larger effort to reconstitute post-conflict societies in the image of
Western liberal democracies. At a deeper level, the local versus international
debate might also be thought to capture one of the essential dilemmas and
contradictory goals of post-conflict interventions in general. That is, while such
interventions must be responsive to local context, traditions, and political
dynamics in order to be perceived as legitimate, they often seek to challenge and
transform many of the dynamics that may have led to the conflict in the first
place, which can include traditional practices and power structures. 89 Even were
this not the case, in the immediate post-conflict aftermath, the very local political
and cultural structures that might have ordinarily served as an interface point
between the local and the international have often broken down, making it that
much more difficult to find the ideal balance between local and international
agency. Indeed, the very notion of intervention is predicated on some idea of
local failure, which may imply the need for something outside of the local to set
things right again.
Along with the rise of the discourse of the local in academic and policy
circles, many are quick to warn that it is important not to essentialize or
romanticize the local.90 In the field of transitional justice, for example, local
justice and reconciliation practices have in some instances accompanied more
standard (or Western) transitional justice interventions in intriguing ways that
hint at great potential for furthering reconciliation and accountability.9 At the
same time, local practices can occasionally be difficult to reconcile with
international principles.92 Supposedly local practices may also be subject to
88 See Lundy and McGovern, 35 J L & Socy at 271 (cited in note 19) (criticizing the "one-size- fits-
all" and "top-down" approaches to transitional justice).
89 See Leebaw, 30 Hum Rts Q at 117 (cited in note 6).
90 See Donais, 34 Peace & Change at 11-13 (cited in note 85); Richmond, 44 Intl Spectator: Ital J
Intl Aff at 153 (cited in note 17) (discussing the various unhelpful ways in which internationals
tend to romanticize the local).
91 In East Timor, for example, the Community Reconciliation Process brought together aspects of
local justice, arbitration, and mediation in order to bring perpetrators and former combatants into
dialogue with their estranged communities. See generally Burgess, New Approach to Restorative Justice
(cited in note 57). In Sierra Leone, the non-governmental organization Fambul Tok ("Family
Talk" in the local Krio language) has worked to address some of the shortcomings of the national
truth and reconciliation commission by implementing a program of local ritual and truth telling at
the village level. See generally Park, 13 Contemp Just Rev 95 (cited in note 57).
92 Roger Duthie, LocalJustice and Reintegration Processes as Complements to Transitional Justice and DDR, in
Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf, eds, Disarming the Past 190, 243-45 (cited in note 8).
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capture by elites who would use them for their own political purposes. In
Rwanda, for example, the local dispute-settlement practice of gacaca was
modified and adopted at a national level to address justice and reconciliation
issues that followed in the wake of the 1994 genocide. While this development
was initially heralded by some, it has also been observed that gacaca has been
implemented in ways that, while they serve the interests of the Kagame
government, may not fully serve the needs of community justice and
reconciliation.93 Thus, as the Rwanda case illustrates, the turn to the local in
matters of peacebuilding and transitional justice offers no easy solutions, and
ultimately the concepts of both local and international might be marshaled to
further important emancipatory goals in the post-conflict context.
9 4
IV. BUILDING LINKAGES BETWEEN PEACEBUILDING AND
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Although international peacebuilding and transitional justice efforts parallel
each other in many ways, ranging from shared historical origins in post-Cold
War dynamics and political currents to similarities in the sharp critiques that
these efforts have generated, peace and justice initiatives have not always been
seen to walk hand in hand. Indeed, over the last twenty-five years, the "peace
versus justice" debate, in which the imperatives of justice are thought to threaten
possibilities for peace and stability, has proved to be an enduring one, seeming
to erupt nearly every time an international tribunal indicts a high-level official or
former warlord.95
93 For example, crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Tutsi-led military force that
stopped the genocide, are excluded from the gacaca process. See Le Mon, 14 Hum Rts Brief at 18
(cited in note 57). For a rosier assessment at the outset of the implementation of gacaca, see
generally Timothy Longman, Justice at the Grassmots? Gacaca Trials in Rwanda, in Roht-Arriaza and
Mariezcurrena, eds, TransitionalJustice in the Tweny First Centug 206 (cited in note 57).
94 Sharp, 35 Fordham Intl LJ at 800 (cited in note 78).
95 See, for example, Louise Arbour, Editorial, Justice v Polics, NY Times (Sept 16, 2008) online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/opinion/16iht-edarbour.1.16197765.html (visited Apr 10,
2013) (justifying her controversial decision to indict Slobodan Miloievi6 even though it was
criticized at the time for threatening the peace process); IRIN Humanitarian News & Analysis,
Liberia. ECOWAS Chairman Urges UN to Laft Taylor Indictment, online at
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/44642/LIBERIA-ECOWAS-chairman-urges-UN-to-lift-
Taylor-indictment (visited Apr 10, 2013) (discussing the argument of the then chairman of the
Economic Community of West African States, President John Kufuor of Ghana, that the UN
should set aside the indictment of Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone on the
grounds that it was necessary to facilitate a negotiated settlement to Liberia's civil war); Jeffrey
Gettleman and Alexis Okeowo, Warlord's Absence Derails Another Peace Efot in Uganda, NY Times
A9 (Apr 12, 2008) (discussing the refusal of the leader of the Lord's Resistance Army to attend
peace negotiations due in part to indictments from the International Criminal Court).
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Perhaps in part as a result of these perceived tensions, scholars and
practitioners of transitional justice have not historically tended to ground their
research or praxis in vocabularies of peace or peacebuilding. 96 To a large extent,
the connections between peacebuilding and transitional justice have been
"under-researched."97 Yet despite these historic tensions, current UN doctrine
holds that peace and justice are mutually supportive, even if the timing,
modalities, and sequencing of peace and justice initiatives need to be carefully
considered. 98 More recent transitional justice scholarship has tended to play
down the potential for conflict between peace and justice.99 At the same time,
the shared space and common goals of peacebuilding and transitional justice in
the post-conflict context have led to an increasing interest by both academics
and policymakers in exploring the possibilities for linkages and
complementarity.
100
A. Acknowledging Both Tensions and Complementarity
Given many of the shared goals of peacebuilding and transitional
justice-rebuilding social trust and social capital, addressing problems of
governance and accountability, and fostering institutional reform, to name only a
few-the desire to promote linkages and complementarity seems eminently
sensible. And yet, a closer examination reveals that many of the traditional
programmatic components of international post-conflict peacebuilding have the
potential to both complement and conflict with transitional justice initiatives. 101
96 See Andrieu, 41 Security Dialogue at 539 (cited in note 17) (noting that "few transitional justice
scholars have yet situated their research in the context of peacebuilding, seeing it instead through
the dominant lens of legalism and human rights'); Lambourne, 3 Ind J Transitional Just at 29
(cited in note 18) (noting that "few researchers have analyzed the relationship between justice,
reconciliation and peacebuilding"). A notable exception to this trend is Rama Mani whose
pioneering work took a much more holistic approach to issues of justice and peace in the post-
conflict context. See generally Mani, 2 lntl J Transitional Just 253 (cited in note 52).
97 See van Zyl, Promoting Transitional Justice at 210 (cited in note 7).
98 See UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies
at 8, 21 (cited in note 9).
99 See Leebaw, 30 Hum Rts Q at 96, 98 (cited in note 6).
100 See, for example, Sriram, Martin-Ortega, and Herman, Evaluating and Comparing Strategies of
Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice at 13 (cited in note 10) (discussing increasing linkages between
transitional justice and a broader set of peacebuilding activities); Bryden, Shaping a Securiy-
Governance Agenda in Post-Conict Peacebuilding at 20-22 (cited in note 10) (examining policy linkages
between SSR, DDR, rule of law initiatives, and transitional justice); van Zyl, Promoting Transitional
Justice at 210 (cited in note 7) (arguing that "[t]ransitional justice strategies should be understood as
an important component of peacebuilding').
101 See generally Herman, Martin-Ortega, and Sriram, Beyond Justice versus Peace (cited in note 11)
(discussing the potential tensions between transitional justice, rule of law assistance, DDR, and
SSR).
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As but two examples, I briefly outline here the potential for tension and
complementarity between transitional justice and programs relating to the
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants and
security sector reform more generally.
In the last twenty years, DDR programs have become a regular feature of
post-conflict peacebuilding. °2 Of recent peacekeeping missions, at least seven of
those established by the UN Security Council included DDR in their mandate.0 3
While programs vary in terms of their modalities, the basic goal of all such
programs is to assure security and stability in the post-conflict context by
removing weapons from the hands of former combatants and helping them to
integrate socially and economically into society.0 4 If done well, DDR programs
have the potential to contribute to the very stability that might be thought
essential to getting larger development and justice initiatives off the ground.
While few would therefore dispute the need for such programs, they have often
been criticized for a short-term "guns for cash" approach that may shortchange
some of the longer-term and more challenging goals of DDR, particularly the
reintegration of former combatants back into the community. 05
Despite increasingly global experience and expertise with DDR, it has
been hard to overlook the disappointing results of many DDR programs,
ultimately leading the UN and others to stress the need for a more "integrated"
approach." 6 But while more integrated approaches sound laudable in the
abstract, such efforts have the potential to create enormous challenges when
102 Between 1994 and 2005, thirty-four different DDR programs were created around the world.
Waldorf, Linking DDR and Transitional Justice at 18 (cited in note 8). For a more detailed
exploration of tensions and complementarities between DDR and transitional justice in broad
comparative terms, see generally Chandra Lekha Sriram and Johanna Herman, DDR and
TransitionalJustice: Bridng the Divide?, 9 Conflict, Security & Dev 455 (2009).
103 These are the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999), the United
Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, 1999), the United Nations
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, 2003), the United Nations Mission in C6te d'Ivoire (UNOCI, 2004),
the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004), the United Nations
Operation in Burundi (UNOB, 2004), and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS,
2005).
104 See IDDRS' at § 1.2 (cited in note 12).
105 United Nations Development Programme, Practice Note: Disarmament, DemobikiZation and
Reintegration of Ex-Combatants 18 (UNDP 2005).
106 See United Nations, Report of the Secretagy-General" Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, UN
Doc A/60/705 at 4 9(b) (2006); Mark Knight and Alpaslan Ozerdem, Guns, Camps and Cash:
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace, 41 J
Peace Rsrch 499, 513 (2004). The felt need for better integration helped in part to spur the
publication of the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
(IDDRS), a policy guide that sets forth best practices for DDR programming and the various
ways in which it can and should be linked with other post-conflict programmatic areas, including
transitional justice. See generally, IDDRS (cited in note 12).
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dealing with fields such as DDR and transitional justice that, historically, have
enjoyed few connections at the level of policy and practice.0 7 The historical
separation between DDR and transitional justice may in part reflect a perception
that they are meant to serve different constituencies for different purposes.
Thus, while transitional justice mechanisms are often viewed as victim oriented,
DDR is seen to serve the needs of former perpetrators.' 8 While transitional
justice focuses on justice and accountability for past violations, traditional
approaches to DDR focus on military and security objectives. °
With this backdrop in mind, it is not hard to imagine that the existence
of robust accountability mechanisms might make some former combatants
reluctant to come forward and lay down their arms. Moreover, to the extent that
those who need to be disarmed are either embedded in state security forces or
stand to be integrated into reconstituted state security forces as part of a larger
SSR program, this too makes the prospects for restoration of the rule of law
difficult since the very forces responsible for enforcing the law have the most to
lose from the accountability measures that are part and parcel of transitional
justice."0 Beyond this, the provision of reinsertion and reintegration benefits to
former combatants, a typical feature of many DDR programs, can be contrasted
with the relative paucity and lack of generosity of reparations programs for
victims."' The perception that former perpetrators are being rewarded for bad
behavior while former victims are left to fend for themselves could ultimately
make reintegration and reconciliation initiatives difficult."'
Taken together, there is ample potential for tension between DDR
programs and transitional justice initiatives. However, despite the potential to
work at cross-purposes, DDR programs and transitional justice mechanisms also
share common goals, including trust-building, prevention of renewed violence,
107 See Waldorf, Linking DDR and TransitionalJustice at 16 (cited in note 8).
108 The victim/perpetrator distinction can be problematic in several respects, particularly in the
context of DDR where many former combatants are both perpetrators and victims at the same
time. See Luisa Maria Dietrich Ortega, TransitionalJusice and Female Ex-Combatants: Lessons Learned
from International Experience, in Patel, de Greiff, Waldorf, eds, Disarming the Past 158, 169 (cited in
note 8)
109 Kimberly Theidon, Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former
Combatants in Columbia, 1 Ind J Transitional Just 67, 69 (2007).
110 Herman, Martin-Ortega, and Sriram, BeyondJusice versus Peace at 55 (cited in note 11)
111 See Eric A. Witte, Bgyond "Peace versus Juslice": Understanding the Relationship between DDR Programs and
the Prosecution of International Crimes, in Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf, eds, Disarming the Past 86, 96
(cited in note 8).
112 See generally Jeremy Ginifer, Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, in Mark Malan, et al, eds, Sierra Leone:
Building the Road to Recover 39 (Institution for Security Studies 2003).
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and reconciliation." 3 In terms of furthering these common goals, there are a
number of areas of potential complementarity, particularly as regards the
reintegration component of DDR programs. For example, while there is some
evidence to suggest that parallel DDR and transitional justice initiatives might
decrease former combatants willingness to come forward and engage in truth
telling and reconciliation activities, it can also be argued that sending a strong
public signal that only the "big fish" will be put on trial might allow victims to
feel justice is being done, while at the same time making it clear that most
combatants were not among the worst offenders and can be reconciled to their
community. 14 Beyond community-level reconciliation, which will be discussed
in more detail in the next section, building stronger linkages between DDR and
transitional justice would likely involve a greater focus on human rights vetting
to ensure that abusive former combatants are not channeled into reconstituted
security services."' This mechanism, along with other accountability
mechanisms, could ultimately enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the new
forces, while at the same time lowering the chances of recurrence of abuses by
the reformed security forces, even if the potential for some short-term frictions
cannot be eliminated.
16
SSR is a process that could be thought to include DDR but which is at
the same time much broader and more comprehensive. While definitions of SSR
vary in scope, the UN generally understands it to comprise efforts to promote
"effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without
discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.""17
Similar to DDR programs, there exists a significant potential for tension
113 According to one UN definition, the aims of transitional justice include ensuring accountability,
serving justice, achieving reconciliation, and preventing human rights violations in the future. See
United Nations, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies at 4, 4
(cited in note 9). The IDDRS similarly underscores the centrality of DDR programs to preventing
renewed violence, encouraging trust and confidence, and reconciliation. See IDDRS at § 1.2 (cited
in note 12).
114 In Sierra Leone, for example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone's outreach efforts included
activities targeting ex-combatants to explain the meaning of the phrase those "who bear the
greatest responsibility" for crimes within its mandate. The purpose of these efforts was to dispel
rumors that the court intended to indict every fighter, from top to bottom. See Mohamed Gibril
Sesay and Mohamed Suma, Transitional Justice and DDR." The Case of Sierra Leone 18-19
(International Center for Transitional Justice 2009).
115 See Mobekk, Transitional justice and Securio Sector Reform at 68-71 (cited in note 54) (discussing the
role of vetting in conducting reform of military forces, police services, the judiciary, intelligence
services, and the governance sector).
116 See id at 18 (discussing the role of SSR and transitional justice in engendering trust in critical state
institutions).
117 See United Nations, Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Secu
Sector Reform UN Doc A/62/659, S/2008/39 at 6, 17 (2008).
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between SSR programs and transitional justice initiatives. "8 The potential for
conflict between members of the security sector, who risk possibly being
downsized or excluded through vetting procedures, and transitional justice,
which seeks to promote accountability and truth-telling for abusive members of
those same security forces, is fairly straightforward and obvious. At the same
time, without security and stability, accountability mechanisms associated with
transitional justice will have difficulty functioning. Thus, the basic tension
between the felt needs of stability and security on the one hand, and the
exigencies of accountability and human rights on the other, renders the already
complicated task of reforming or reconstituting the security sector all the more
challenging. Perhaps in part due to this potential for tension, SSR and
transitional justice "rarely interact, either in practice or in theory."' 9
Despite these tensions, it would be difficult to foster effective and
accountable security "with full respect for human rights and the rule of law"'2°
without some attention to issues of past abuses and impunity. In particular,
attention to these issues through both transitional justice and SSR mechanisms
has the potential to provide a much-needed sense of legitimacy for formerly
abusive security forces.1 2' This, together with other potential avenues of
complementarity, has given rise to a small but growing literature exploring the
possibility of a "justice-sensitive" approach to SSR that would include, among
other things, more robust human rights training and vetting. 22 Thus, as with
DDR, building better linkages between SSR and transitional justice could
ultimately promote trust building, prevention of renewed violence, and
reconciliation.
As defined by some global institutions, the "security sector" extends well
beyond traditional security actors like the police and the military to management
and oversight bodies, broader justice and rule of law institutions, and non-
statutory security forces. 123 It is particularly in this broader conception of security
sector reform, with its inclusion of the judicial sector and access to justice, that
the potentially positive linkages between SSR and transitional justice might be
more apparent. Therefore, while not always thought of as being part of SSR,
118 See Herman, Martin-Ortega, and Sriram, Beyond Justice versus Peace at 60-61 (cited in note 11).
119 Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, Enhancing Justice and Development at 222 (cited in note 8).
120 United Nations, Securing Peace and Development at 6, 17 (cited in note 117).
121 Herman, Martin-Ortega, and Sriram, Beyond Justice versus Peace at 60-61 (cited in note 11).
122 See for example, Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, Enhancing Justice and Development at 215 (cited in note
8); Barr, 26 PRAXIS: Fletcher J Hum Security at 5 (cited in note 54), Mobekk, Transitional Justice
and Security Sector Reform at 1-7 (cited in note 54); Laura Davis, Justice-Sensitive Security System Reform
in the Democratic Republc of the Congo 24-26 (Initiative for Peacebuilding 2009).
123 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD DAC Handbook on Secunio
System Reform: Supporting Securi and Justice 5 (OECD 2007).
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programs that ensure access to justice, particularly access to justice for those
abused by security forces, could be one way of fostering accountability long-
term, and maintaining sustained "bottom-up" pressure for reform on the
security sector as a whole.'
24
B. Building Linkages through the Lens of Critique
The potential for both conflict and complementarity between
transitional justice and peacebuilding initiatives highlights the need for
coordination sufficient to mitigate tensions and promote positive overlaps.
Indeed, recognition of the need to promote coherence and integration while
avoiding the fragmented and duplicative approaches of the past helped in part to
inspire the creation of the PBC in 2005.125 The many challenges associated with
building peace and justice in the post-conflict context call for holistic solutions
that address crosscutting challenges. For these reasons, this Article takes it as a
starting point that promoting synergies between peacebuilding and transitional
justice programs and initiatives is a worthwhile goal. At the same time, despite
the seemingly unobjectionable nature of appeals for greater coordination, more
integrated approaches to peace and justice issues in the post-conflict context
may also create problems and challenges of their own.
To begin, the UN's historic track record on coordination leaves ample
room for improvement, and initial assessments of the PBC's ability to promote
more integrated approaches to complex and multi-dimensional peacebuilding
challenges have not been optimistic. 126 Further complicating the task of
coordination is the fact that post-conflict peacebuilding is a large and
multifaceted task, with key roles being played by a variety of actors. Though this
Article has focused largely on the UN, the larger post-conflict peacebuilding
picture also includes actors over which the PBC has no direct authority, ranging
from the World Bank and key bilateral donors such as the US, the EU, and
Japan to national governments, civil society actors, and various local
constituencies. Getting actors both in and outside of the UN system to work
towards more integrated approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding is an
124 For a review of the potential for "bottom-up" access to justice initiatives to effect larger rule of
law reforms, see generally Stephen Golub, The Rule of Law and the UN Peacebuilding Commission: A
Social DevelopmentApproach, 20 Camb Rev Intl Aff 47 (2007).
125 See General Assembly Res No 60/180 at 1 (cited in note 37); Security Council Res No 1645 at 1
(cited in note 37) (emphasizing the need for a "coordinated, coherent, and integrated approach to
post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation"); Jubilut, 9 Minn J Intl L at 31 (cited in note 36)
(discussing the problem of redundant and ad hoc efforts and a lack of coordination in
peacekeeping missions of the past).
126 See United Nations, Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, UN Doc A/64/868-
S/2010/393 at 16, 57-59 (2010).
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enormous task, especially given the stove-piping, overlapping mandates, and
bureaucratic territorialism that have plagued such efforts in the past. 12 It is
important to note that coordination difficulties stem not only from the
magnitude of the task or difficulties of communication amongst all of the
various players, but also because of underlying disagreements and uncertainties
as to how to best accomplish peacebuilding objectives in the first place. 12
Second, beyond the inherent challenges of large-scale coordination itself,
there is a danger of over-standardization and bureaucratization as best practices
for the coordination of transitional justice and peacebuilding initiatives are taken
up by the global institutions associated with post-conflict peacebuilding and
development assistance that have the tendency to operate through standardized
templates. 29 It has been argued that as transitional justice practices have spread
around the world, they have done so not necessarily by adapting themselves de
novo to each new context, but through a process of "acculturation" whereby a
dominant script or practice is replicated again and again as a result of repeated
information exchanges and consultations. 3 ' Once a dominant paradigm or script
develops, modifying that script to suit new conditions or circumstances can be
extremely challenging. 3' In the context of internationally driven peacebuilding
initiatives more generally, the existence of "set templates" and a "formulaic
path" has similarly been observed.'32 Given these tendencies, there is reason to
worry that-notwithstanding paeans to national ownership and context-
appropriate solutions-as transitional justice is mainstreamed into emerging best
practices for post-conflict reconstruction, transitional justice initiatives will come
to be seen as yet another item on the "post-conflict checklist," a mechanistic
part of the template deployed in the context of post-conflict peace operations."'
127 See Herman, Martin-Ortega, and Sriram, Beyond Justice versus Peace at 62 (cited in note 11)
(observing that improving connections between peacebuilding and transitional justice requires a
level of coordination that large bureaucracies are not very good at).
128 See Roland Paris, Understanding the "Coordination Problem" in PostwarStatebuilding, in Roland Paris and
Timothy D. Sisk, eds, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace
Operations 53, 72 (Routledge 2009).
129 As Roland Paris has argued, this is particularly true insofar as efforts at coordination give impetus
to centripetal forces in policymaking. See id at 62.
130 James Cavallaro and Sebastil.n Albuja, The Lost Agenda: Economic Crimes and Truth Commissions in
Latin America and Beyond, in Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor, eds, Transitional Justice from
Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change 121, 125 (Hart 2008).
131 See id.
132 See Sending, Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and Be Sensitive to Context at 7 (cited in note
81) (observing that "international organizations, such as the UN and the World Bank, are
bureaucratic organizations that operate through standardized templates").
133 See Elizabeth Stanley, Transitional Justice: From the Local to the International, in Patrick Hayden, ed,
The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations 275, 276 (Ashgate 2009)
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That post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice initiatives have
frequently been criticized for being planned and implemented in a top-down,
externally driven, and Western-biased manner, only serves to highlight the
concern of standardization.34
Third, as explored in Section III of this Article, international peacebuilding
programs, as well as a number of transitional justice initiatives, have frequently
been subject to powerful, parallel critiques, including the critique of liberal
international peacebuilding, the critique of politics as neutral technology, and
concerns about striking the right balance between the local and the international
in post-conflict programming. Considered together with the danger of over-
standardization, there is reason to worry that better integration and coordination
between peacebuilding and transitional justice, especially insofar as it is carried
out by the large bureaucracies traditionally associated with post-conflict
assistance, might actually exacerbate some of the tendencies that have given rise
to these parallel critiques rather than alleviate them. At a minimum, given
historic patterns, there is no reason to think that simply linking peacebuilding
and transitional justice, without more, will do anything to counter these
tendencies.
Given the potential problems and challenges inherent in attempting to
build stronger linkages between peacebuilding and transitional justice initiatives,
it would not be unreasonable to question the compatibility of more integrated
approaches involving a strong international role with the types of locally owned,
context-specific, and bottom-up solutions suggested by the critiques that have
arisen in the academic and policy literature. 35 On the other hand, from a
pragmatic and realist standpoint, a balance between local and international
agency in post-conflict programming seems both inevitable and desirable, due in
part to the resources and expertise that internationals can at times bring to
bear.'36 With this perspective in mind, as scholars, practitioners, and
policymakers begin to take a greater interest in sounding out potential linkages,
viewing transitional justice and peacebuilding overlaps through the prism of the
critiques and concerns outlined in this Article should prove instructive.
Attentiveness to some of the parallel critiques and concerns that have been
raised could lead to shifts that would strengthen policy in both areas in the
process of promoting linkages.
(observing that, together with other international interventions, "transitional justice practices have
commonly become part of a longer list of 'tickboxes' to attain peace and security').
134 See Section III.
135 Sec Section III.
136 See Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza, 2 Intl J Transitional Just at 153 (cited in note 21) (arguing for
strategies that "incorporate a perspective that encompasses bottom-up local efforts as well as top-
down state-driven or internationally driven ones").
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Ultimately, promoting linkages that reflect a cognizance of critique might
involve more hybridized forms of peacebuilding and transitional justice that
involve a mixture of conventional and local practices and models. 3 For
example, as previously discussed, DDR programs and transitional justice
initiatives have the potential to both conflict with and complement each other,
and careful coordination is called for if. synergies are to be exploited. One of the
areas where DDR programs have had the least amount of success is in the
community reintegration element, sometimes known as the forgotten "R" of
DDR, or the "the weakest link in the DDR chain." '38 This is an area where the
reconciliation components of transitional justice initiatives might serve as a
potential bridge, strengthening both DDR and transitional justice goals in the
process. 139 The potential use of local ritual and tradition in facilitating
reconciliation generally and the reintegration of former combatants specifically
might be one way of building linkages between transitional justice and DDR
programs that gives deference to the critiques and concerns that have in the past
plagued both fields (including that they are Western-biased and externally
driven).) + Such approaches to reintegration have seen limited but intriguing use
in Sierra Leone and Mozambique.' Similarly, in East Timor, a post-conflict
community reconciliation process combined aspects of arbitration and
mediation grounded in local ritual in bringing former perpetrators and
combatants into dialogue with their estranged communities and victims.142 In the
future, it might be possible for coordinating bodies like the PBC to encourage
the use of local ritual and tradition to bridge the gap between DDR and
transitional justice. This could, of course, be a difficult needle to thread since too
much international involvement in such affairs might be seen to co-opt or
137 See Newman, Paris, and Richmond, Introduction at 16 (cited in note 2).
138 Sami Faltas, DDR without Camps: The Needfor DecentrafizedApproaches: Topical Chapter of the Conversion
Survey 1 (Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2005), online at www.sweden.gov.se/
content/I/c6/06/54/02/5d16fcf2.pdf (visited Apr 10, 2013); see also Macartan Humphreys and
Jeremy M. Weinstein, Demobilization and Reintegration, 51 J Conflict Res 531, 549 (2007) (concluding
that combatants who did not participate in DDR were reintegrated as successfully as those who
did).
139 For a longer elaboration of this argument, see Sharp, Bridging the Gap at 34-36 (cited in note 15).
For an exploration of the application of local ritual in the context of the reintegration of former
child combatants, see Roger Duthie and Irma Specht, DDR, TransitfionalJustice, and the Reintegration
of Former Child Combatants, in Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf, eds, Disarming the Past 190, 207-10
(cited in note 8).
140 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Stockholm Initiative on DDR, Final Report 30 (March 2006),
online at http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890 (visited Apr 10, 2013); see also Theidon, 1 Intl J
Transitional Just at 90 (cited in note 109).
141 See generally Duthie, LocalJusice and Reintegration Processes (cited in note 92).
142 See generally Burgess, A NewApproach to RestorativeJusfice (cited in note 57).
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corrupt the authenticity of local practices. Nevertheless, the PBC could play a
helpful role even if only to brief local constituencies as to the range of local
ritual that has been successfully used in other contexts.
While this is but one example, we should be attentive to similar possibilities
as we contemplate promoting greater linkages between peacebuilding and
transitional justice. This Article does not attempt to set forth a comprehensive
approach along these lines, but there are possibilities ripe for exploration. One
such example might be the use of "bottom-up" approaches to rule of law
assistance that attempt to effect reforms though grassroots legal
empowerment.143  Another such example could be more comprehensive
approaches to transitional justice and SSR programs that give greater emphasis
to accountability for economic crimes and economic violence perpetrated in the
course of the conflict.1 " Additional possibilities that would cut against the grain
of longstanding critiques of transitional justice and peacebuilding need to be
developed by academics, practitioners, and policymakers going forward.
V. CONCLUSION
Though historically seen as being in competition with the demands of
peace, transitional justice is increasingly accepted as an important element of
post-conflict peacebuilding. Along with the demobilization and disarmament of
ex-combatants, security sector reform, rule of law programs, and elections, it has
now joined a virtual checklist of post-conflict interventions spearheaded by the
international community in post-conflict countries. This increasingly shared
space between transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives has
sparked new interest among both scholars and policymakers in sounding out
potential connections between both fields. Although the pursuit of synergies
between peacebuilding and transitional justice programs is a worthwhile goal, in
developing these connections, we must also be keenly attentive to mutual
shortcomings. Transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding have
historically proceeded on separate tracks, yet there has been a remarkable
similarity in the critiques and concerns that have been leveled against both fields
in the last two decades. There are strong reasons to suspect that more integrated
approaches to peacebuilding and transitional justice will have the tendency to
exacerbate some of the tendencies that have given rise to these parallel critiques
143 See generally Golub, 20 Camb Rev Intl Aff 47 (cited in note 124).
144 See generally Sharp, 35 Fordham Int LJ 780 (cited in note 78) (discussing the peripheral status of
economic violence and economic justice in mainstream transitional justice initiatives); see also
Carranza, 2 Intl J Transitional Just at 310 (cited in note 53) (arguing that transitional justice must
do more to grapple with corruption and other economic crimes that may have helped to
precipitate the conflict).
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rather than alleviate them. Seeking synergies and overlaps through the optics of
these historic concerns and critiques could be one technique of resistance to
these tendencies. To be sure, exploiting overlaps while addressing critiques and
pushing back against long dominant paradigms would bring its own challenges.
At the same time, such efforts could take us one step forward in moving beyond
the post-conflict checklist and toward the development of more holistic and
innovative approaches to the challenge of building peace with justice in conflict's
wake.
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